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Abstract 
Agribusiness is one of the policy options in most countries to ensure food security, reduce poverty and support 
family farming towards modernization. Under these conditions, farmers and agribusiness companies are entering 
into agricultural contracts in some developing countries, like Senegal and Mauritius. This research aims to evaluate 
the impact of agribusiness contracts on farmers' incomes in the Senegal River Delta and Mauritius. The sample 
surveyed is 270 farmers in Mauritius (93 treated) and 320 in the Senegal Delta (147 treated), coupled with 
interviews and bibliographic research. To analyze the data, we used the propensity score matching method based 
on the counterfactual approach. The impact of agricultural contracts on farmers' incomes in Mauritius is € 1,648 
per agricultural season with a threshold of 10% of significance. In the Senegal Delta, this impact is € 505, but it is 
not significant. This research therefore suggests that agribusiness production contracts are more favorable to 
improve the agricultural income of family farms. 
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1. Introduction 
Agriculture plays an important role in the economies of African countries. It is an important source of economic 
growth (Gollin, 2010) and also contributes to poverty reduction (Loayza and Raddatz, 2010) in many developing 
countries. Agricultural activities are organized and implemented by family farms (Zoundi, Hitimana, & Hussein, 
2005). However, they are confronted by continued population growth, economic liberalization and globalization 
and deteriorating production conditions. In addition, they face problems in accessing credit and certified inputs 
and new production techniques and technologies. Therefore, their modernization is essential to increase production 
and productivity in order to meet the needs of these populations. 
Thus, African countries, such as Senegal and Mauritius, pay particular attention to technology transfer and 
innovative institutional arrangements for farmer’s development. Under these conditions, contract farming is 
introduced into the agricultural sector and is considered an effective means of transferring technology to farmers. 
It improves agricultural production and marketing, which can lead to an increase in farmers' incomes. 
The importance of agricultural contracts in developing countries is a subject of interest and controversy. Some 
studies indicate that agricultural contracts increase farmers' incomes (Warning and Key, 2002; Miyata et al, 2009; 
Saigenji and Zeller, 2009; Meshesha, 2011; Nguyen et al. 2015; Sokchea and Culas, 2015). These studies have 
shown that contract farming helps smallholder farmers improve the cultivation and marketing of their agricultural 
products 
Farmers have access to agricultural inputs, agricultural equipment and machinery, credit and know-how (Cai 
et al., 2008; Glover, 1984; Sethboonsarng, 2008). 
However, contract farming is the subject of much criticisms regarding the unequal relationship between the 
parties to the contract, an unbalanced bargaining power (Warning and Key, 2002; MacDonald et al., 2004; 
Sivramkrishna and Jyotishi, 2008).  Cai et al. (2008) found that contract farmers earn less income than former 
contract farmers, non-contract farmers used to participate in the contract. In addition, competition and exclusion 
of smallholder farmers (Baumann, 2000; CREM, 2008; Sartorius and Kirsten, 2007) as well as agricultural input 
indebtedness and credit (Eaton and Shepherd, 2001) are among the negative consequences of agricultural contracts. 
This paper examines the potential of contract farming as a tool for rural development by revealing its impact 
on farmers' agricultural incomes in the Senegal Delta River and Mauritius. 
 
2. Methodology 
2.1. Data Collection 
The choice of our research areas therefore focused on the Delta of the Senegal River and Mauritius in view of their 
very favourable climate for crops, their important hydraulic potential, their high growth potential and especially 
the concentration of important agribusiness in these areas. Study agribusiness is selected randomly, and based on 
its importance and the existence of contractual arrangements with farmers (Table1). 
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Table 1: List of agribusinesses by zone 
Delta of Senegal Mauritius 
GDS : Grands Domaines du Sénégal Médine Agriculture 
SCL : Société des Cultures Légumière  ENL Agriculture 
SOCAS : Société de Conserves Alimentaire du Sénégal Compagnie Labourdonnais 
WAF : West Africa Farms  SKC Surat 
CSS : Compagnie Sucrière Sénégalaise Conserverie Sarjua 
SOLDIVE  
SENHUILE  
Beneficiary farmers (treated) were chosen by randomly and according to three criteria: (i) they live in villages 
close to agribusiness; (ii) they have contracts with agribusiness (iii) they have as main or secondary activity 
agriculture. Next, we use the non-random harmonized propensity score method to determine the counterfactual 
sample (control) (Rubin, 1997; Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983). Thus, we use survey data from 270 farmers (93 of 
them treated) in Mauritius and 350 (including 147 treated) in the Senegal River Delta conducted from December 
2015 to March 2016. 
 
2.2. Analysis: Treatment Effects Model 
We evaluate the impacts of adopting contracts (T) on farm income (Y). Define an indicator variable, T, which 
equals one if a farmer received a treatment (i.e., participated in agricultural contracts of agribusiness) and zero if 
not. Further, define the outcome variables Y for each farmer, income in our case. We will sometimes write Yi(T = 
1) to emphasize that the ith farmer is defined as a farmer who had received a treatment. Either Y1 the income of the 
treated farmers and Y0 the income obtained from the non-treated:  1,  ℎ
 
  

   = 10,  ℎ
 
  

  = 0                               (1) 
The observed outcome variable for each group can be defined by the following relationship: 
Yi = TiY1 + (1-Ti)Y0                                                                                                  (2) 
The program’s average treatment effect on the treated (∆i) is the difference between Y1 and Y0 for the set of treated 
farmers:   
∆i = Yi1 - Yi0                                                                           (3) 
The expected treatment effect of contract participation is the difference between the actual income and the income 
if they did not participate: This can be written as:  ∆ATT = E(Yi1 - Yi0│Ti = 1)                                                    (4) 
The effect of treatment on treated is the difference between the average income with treatment   
E (Yi1│Ti = 1), 
which must be compared with the income they would have had if they had not been treated  
E (Yi0│Ti = 1). 
Naive comparison between treated and untreated (control): 
                         E(Yi │Ti = 1) - E(Yi │Ti = 0) =E(Yi1│Ti = 1) - E(Yi0│Ti = 0)                     (5)                                                             
=E(Yi1│Ti = 1) - E(Yi0│Ti = 1)+ E(Yi0│Ti = 1) - E(Yi0│Ti= 0) 
E(Yi1│Ti = 1) - E(Yi0│Ti = 1) 
is the average effect of the change in income of farmers who benefit from a contract (treated) compared to the 
hypothetical situation where they would not have been. 
E(Yi0│Ti = 1) - E(Yi0│Ti= 0) : 
selection bias, reflects an average structural difference between the treated and control group. 
The implementation of the propensity score method involves several steps: estimating the propensity score and 
assessing the quality of the estimated propensity score. 
The propensity score is estimated by the Logit model in the first step. This model includes all observed variables 
that influence treatment selection and the outcome (Jebabli & Zaiem, 2010).  
The Logit model defines the probability associated with the event Yi = 1, as the value of the distribution function 
of the logistic law considered in point Π(X) 
 =  ! +  #1$1 + #2$2 + ⋯ +  #$  =  ' ()*+(),                 (6)                         =  -./01*2 -./01 = * *2 -3./01. 
h(xi) is formed by linear and higher order terms. 
Then, we determine the common support of the propensity score to ensure that for each individual who has 
accessed the contract we can find at least one individual who has not accessed with the same propensity score.  
To build the common support of the propensity score, we use the Nearest Neighbour Matching method. With 
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this method, we matched each group of farmers treated with a control group closest to it (Khandker, et al., 2010; 
Jebabli & Zaiem, 2010).  
Let T all farmers treated and C all control units, and such as 45  and 67  are the observed results of treated and 
control, respectively. 
C(i) all untraited farmers adapted to all treated farmers i with an estimated value of the pi propensity score. 
The overall match with the nearest neighbour is (Becker, 2002; Jebabli & Zaiem, 2010): 
C = 89: ‖< − <9‖ =  >∈7  ‖< − <@‖A 
The average effect of contracts on farmers is given by:  ∆B55= *CD ∑ F454∈5 −  ∑ G466∈74 67]              (7) 
IG46 = 1J7   9 ∈ K G46 = 0   G46 ∈  F01] et ∑ G466∈74 = 1 J7 is the number of untreated farmers matched with the treated group. J5 Corresponds to the number of farmers in the Treated group.  
To assess the impact of agribusiness contracts on farmers' incomes, the equation is: 
Yi =  !  + #Xi + Li                                             (8) 
Yi : agricultural income of farmer i; 
Xi : variable characteristics of farmers (socio-economic characteristics); 
α is a constant and β being the vector of coefficients to these variables Li : error term.. 
 
3. Results and Discussion 
3.1. Propensity score matching analysis 
The influence of exogenous variables on the probability that a farmer will benefit from an agricultural contract is 
studied using the Logit model. This sensitivity is measured in terms of elasticity. The degree of significance of the 
coefficients is the same as at the regression level, since the marginal effects are calculated through the derivative 
of the estimated probability with respect to the components of the exogenous variables. 
The results of the regression show that, although having a positive coefficient, the age of farmers in Mauritius 
is not significant. In the Delta, this variable is level statistical significance at the 5% and thus positively influences 
the probability of farmers participating in agribusiness contracts by 8%. 
The sex variable is negative but significant at the 5% level for Mauritius farmers. It would then lead to a 5% 
decrease in the chance of participating in agricultural contracts. 
The size of the farm, although it has a positive coefficient, is not significant for farmers in Mauritius and 
Delta River. 
Agricultural labour force is positively significant at the 10% level in Mauritius and Delta. It therefore induces 
an increase of 7% and 5% respectively the chance of farmer to benefit from a contract. This result can be explained 
by the fact that agricultural workers constitute the labour force of the farm. 
The cultivated land is negative but significant at the 5% level for Delta farmers. 
Education levels for illiterate and primary farmers are positive and significant at the 10% and 1% level 
respectively. This means that Mauritian farmers at the secondary level have respectively a 30% and 23% higher 
chance of benefiting from contracts compared to illiterate farmers and at the primary and university levels. This 
result could be explained by the fact that educated farmers are more aware of the importance of agricultural 
contracts. Indeed, education is a good indicator of social progress. It allows farmers to acquire and manage relevant 
information more effectively. 
In Mauritius, the rental and purchase/heritage variables are significant at the 1% level but negative. This 
indicates that these would have reduced the farmer's chance of benefiting from a contract by 24% and 31% 
respectively. 
In Delta, the land allocation and purchase/heritage are significant at the 1% level; they would therefore induce 
a marginal increase of 36% and 39% respectively the farmer’s chance to benefit from a contract. Indeed, it ensures 
equality and efficient use of land by providing farmers with access to land and enabling the implementation of a 
production plan. 
In Delta, the income source (fattening, salary, transport and other sources) are positive and significant at the 
1% level and therefore would induce a marginal increase of 35%, 84%, 37% and 21% respectively in the 
probability of a Mauritian farmer to benefit from a contract. However, in Mauritius, the variables salary, and other 
sources are significant but negative. Allocating more time to other off-farm activities generates additional income 
for the farmer. In reality, the second occupation reduces the farmer’s time on the farm. Consequently, it has a 
negative influence on the management of the culture and consequently on technical efficiency. 
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Membership of a farmers' organisation is positively significant at the 5% threshold for farmers in Mauritius. 
This result can be justified by the fact that groups constitute social networks where farmers often have access to 
information and those with more information can be easily aware of agribusiness opportunities and be convinced 
to participate. Olounlade et al. (2014), the presence of these organizations can create dynamism around income-
generating activities and are considered effective means of improving the level of community development. 
The price is statically significant at the respective thresholds of 10% and 1% in the Delta and Mauritius. The 
price variable would positively influence the farmer's probability of participating in agribusiness contracts 
Vegetable production is also positive and significant at the 5% level in Mauritius. The results of the marginal 
effects describe that it would increase by more than 100% the chance of the farmer to benefit from a contract with 
an agribusiness (Table 2). The production agreement allows beneficiary farmers to better estimate their production 
in terms of area to be planted and quality in order to meet their contractual arrangements but their daily needs. 
However, this variable is not significant for farmers in Delta. Indeed, they do not sell their entire production, they 
keep part for their own consumption. 
 Table 2: Propensity score estimation 
Variables  Marginal effects /Delta  of Senegal Marginal effects /Maurice 
dy/dx Std. Err. P>|z| dy/dx Std. Err. P>|z| 
Age 0.0086881 0.0029352 0.013** 0.0023386 0.0062813 0.583(ns)  
Sex : 
Female 
            
-0.037534 0.291897 0.704(ns) -0.5532529 0.0937703 0.012**  
Labour force 0.0579744 0.0175312 0.042* 0.0703597 0.026597  0.089*  
Land Size -0.0689606 0.0211013 0.023** -0.0251283 0.0458599 0.641(ns) 
Farmer Size 0.00285 0.0052566 0.588(ns) 0.0227005 0.0213847 0.288(ns) 
Education             
- lliterates -       0.3093663 0.125617 0.058* 
- primairy 0.0149907 0.0792442 0.882(ns) 0.2364413 0.0643753 0.007***  
- secondairy -0.0957663 0.1268761 0.45(ns)       
-universitaire -0.1531866 0.2497093 0.54(ns) 0.2308271 0.1406321 0.101(ns)  
Land appropriation              
- allocation 0.3687298 0.0966609 0.001***       
- rental 0.2133454 0.1474793 0.148(ns) -0.2435965 0.0624142 0.000*** 
- purchase/ 
heritage 
0.3929741 0.1135303 0.001*** -0.3116401 0.0915431 0.000***  
Income source             
- trade 0.0714147 0.0749189 0.34(ns) -0.2097394 0.1286493 0.103(ns)  
- fattening 0.3526936 0.1120219 0.002*** -0.1314697 0.1423687  0.356(ns)  
- salary 0.8458225 0.0735363 0.001*** -0.1234509 0.0855147 0.073* 
- transport 0.371452 0.183916 0.006***       
- other 0.2137441 0.0835315 0.004*** -0.2263601 0.0741576  0.000***  
Membership of an 
organization 
-0.1332319 0.0840436 0.113(ns) 0.2619057 0.0735055 0.012**  
Price 0.08127  0.9457794  0.097 * 0.54671 0.18350 0,005*** 
Vegetable 
Production  
6.9028907 1.605826 0.666(ns) 3.3012325 1.3575609 0.016** 
Significance: * : 10%     **: 5%    *** : 1%   (ns) : not significant 
We then check the balance of the distribution of the variables between the treated and control group 
(appendix). This involves ensuring that the match leads to a control population similar to that of the treated. 
 
3.2. Impact of contract participation on income 
The results reveal that the production contracts impact of 1648 € per season on the agricultural income of Mauritius 
farmers. In addition, the T-stat test shows that this value is significant at the 10% level (Table 3). These results 
show that participation in the production contracts of potential farmers would have increased agriculture income. 
There is therefore a positive correlation between farmers' income from production and participation in agricultural 
contracts. This confirms the hypothesis that farmers improve their income by participating in agribusiness 
contracts. This increase in income could have an effect on the promotion of modern and competitive agriculture. 
Untreated farmers therefore have the potential to increase their income by entering into agricultural production 
contracts with agribusiness 
In Delta, the impact of these contracts on farmers' farm income is €505. However, the result of the T-stat 
shows that this impact is not significant (Table 3). This means that agribusiness has no statistical effect on farmers' 
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incomes. Indeed, according to 89.80% of the farmers surveyed, these contracts have no effect on their agricultural 
production. It should also be noted that to ensure the food security of the family, farmers in Delta produce to feed 
themselves first and then sell the surplus to meet their needs. 
Many studies show that contract farmers earn a higher income than non-contractual farmers: Miyata et al 
(2009) contractualization increases per capita income by 22% of the average income of apple growers and 45% of 
the average income of green onion growers in China; Kumar (2008), income and employment creation is almost 
double for contract farms; Saigenji and Zeller (2009), contractual participation has a significant effect on income 
of VND 8000 per day per capita in tea production in northwest Vietnam; Meshesha (2011), contracting organic 
honey farmers earn about USD 426.7 to 472.8 per year in southwest Ethiopia; Nguyen (2015) Income from rice 
contract farms in Laos is 1,173 Kip/ha higher than that of independent farms; Sokchea and Culas (2015), 
contracting farmers' net agricultural income has increased by 1,703,500 riels (425.88 dollars) Kampong Thom 
province, Cambodia. 
However, there are also studies that have shown that contract farmers have lower incomes than non-
contractual farmers: Zola et al (2007), the agricultural income of non-contractors is higher in the cultivation of 
rubber, sugar cane, oil palm, cassava, rice, vegetables, tobacco and cotton is higher in Cambodia; Cai et al. (2008), 
former contract rice farmers in Cambodia, on average, if they had joined the contract, their profits would have 
been 0.18 million riel lower than their actual profits; Kumar and Kumar K (2008), livestock incomes are higher 
on non-contractual farms (13080 rupees) than on contract farms (11683 rupees) the Tumkur district of Karnataka 
state; Manorom et al. (2011), non-contractual cabbage and corn producers tend to earn slightly higher profits than 
their contract farming counterparts ($896 versus $698 for cabbage, $1,608 versus $1,456 for corn) in Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic.  
Table 3: Estimation of the impact of contracts on farmers' agricultural income 
    Delta of Senegal Mauritius 
Variable Sample Treated  Controls Difference T-stat Treated  Controls Difference T-stat 
Income Unmatched 2012.77 2223.71 -210.94 -0.45 4873.49 3255.93 1617.56 1.96 
  ATT 2012.77 1507.98 504.78 0.81 4873.49 3225.19 1648.3 0.88 
 
4. Conclusion  
In this article, we have analyzed the impact of agricultural contracts on producers' incomes.  Thus, we have 
identified production contracts in Mauritius while in the Senegal River Delta we have more employment contracts. 
The impact of these contracts on the agricultural income of the treaties is €1648 in Mauritius with a threshold of 
10% significance. In the Delta, the impact of employment contracts on agricultural income is €505, but it is not 
significant. It can therefore be assumed that agricultural production contracts can contribute to improving the 
agricultural incomes of small producers and consequently to the development of family farming. 
One of the implications of these results is that public policies should support the establishment and 
maintenance of contract farming, especially when it comes to small farmers. This support could take the form of 
establishing a clear legal framework for contracts between farmers and agro-industrial companies.  
Facilitating farmers' organizations and other intermediaries such as cooperatives and non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) should be involved in contract farming to facilitate communication and negotiations 
between farmers and agro-industrial. In addition, public-private extension partnerships should be encouraged to 
provide extension services to producers through the contract. 
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APPENDIX 
Graphic 1: Distribution of propensity scores before and after matching Mauritius 
 
Graphic 2: Zone of common support Maurice 
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Graphic 3: Distribution of propensity scores before and after matching Delta 
 
Graphic 4: Zone of common support Delta 
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